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MAKING FORUM NON CONVENIENS
CONVENIENT AGAIN: FINALITY AND
CONVENIENCE FOR TRANSNATIONAL
LITIGATION IN U.S. FEDERAL COURTS
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ABSTRACT
The forum non conveniens (“FNC”) doctrine allows a federal court
to dismiss a case from the U.S. legal system in favor of a more
convenient foreign jurisdiction. When a party moving for dismissal
under the FNC doctrine succeeds, the losing party may immediately
appeal that decision as of right to an appellate court. But if the motion
to dismiss for FNC is denied, the right to an appeal is unavailable until
after a final judgment is issued in the case.
This dichotomy in appellate review results from Van
Cauwenberghe v. Biard, where the Supreme Court held that motions
to dismiss for FNC do not fall within the collateral order exception to
the final judgment rule in federal courts.
Yet motions to dismiss for FNC by definition deal with transnational
disputes, and the Supreme Court has recently been limiting the ability
for transnational litigation to proceed in U.S. courts. This Note argues
that the values underpinning the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence
restrictive of transnational litigation—separation of powers, comity,
fairness, and efficiency—similarly support the Supreme Court altering
the appellate regime for denied motions to dismiss for FNC to allow for
immediate appeals as of right.
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Currently, there are some limited, case-by-case opportunities to seek
interlocutory review of FNC denials. But these mechanisms have
proven to be ineffective. Overruling Biard is the best way to alter the
appellate framework for denied motions to dismiss for FNC. Doing so
would strengthen the utility of the FNC doctrine and serve the Supreme
Court’s interest in limiting the volume of transnational litigation heard
in U.S. federal courts.

INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a defendant in a lawsuit in U.S. federal court.
For more than three and a half years, you spend significant time and
resources litigating a claim. Although you initially file a motion to
dismiss the case, the district court denies your motion. This forces you
to proceed to trial, where you lose on the case’s merits. Afterwards,
you make an appeal to the circuit court of appeals. There, as suddenly
as the litigation began, it ends without any discussion of the merits. This
time, you emerge victorious: the circuit court orders the trial court
judgment vacated and the case removed from the U.S. legal system in
favor of litigation in a foreign state’s courts.
Your victory is bittersweet. While you achieved your desired
result, you know that you will never get back the time, money, and
energy spent litigating a case that you sought dismissed—for the very
reasons provided by the circuit court, no less—over three years earlier.
The rules for appealing decisions in federal courts did not allow you to
seek reversal of the district court’s earlier denial of your motion, and
this forced you to continue litigating until the court of appeals could
hear your case after final judgment at trial.
This hypothetical was the reality in Gonzalez v. Naviera Neptuno
A.A.,1 a case dealing with the “wrongful death claims of the Peruvian
survivors of a Peruvian sailor killed in the United States while serving
on a Peruvian flag vessel, owned by Peruvian citizens, under articles
prepared pursuant to a Peruvian collective bargaining agreement.”2
Following a trial on the merits, the case was dismissed on appeal based
on a motion to dismiss first filed by the defendant and denied by the
district court judge more than three years earlier.3

1. Gonzalez v. Naviera Neptuno A.A., 832 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1987).
2. Id. at 877 (emphasis added).
3. Id. at 881.
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The motion at issue was a motion to dismiss for forum non
conveniens (“FNC”), which, in the federal courts,4 argues that an
alternative forum exists outside of the United States that is both
adequate to hear the litigation and more convenient for this purpose
than the U.S. court.5 The FNC doctrine is a judicially developed
common law doctrine6 that U.S. courts have used for more than two
centuries.7 The doctrine remains a viable tool for courts to dismiss
transnational cases from the U.S. legal system,8 but a dismissal for FNC
is initially left to the discretion of a federal trial judge.9
A difficulty arises when one of the litigants seeks review of the
district court judge’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for FNC. If the trial
judge grants the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the plaintiff may
immediately appeal that decision to the circuit court,10 arguing that the
judge abused her discretion in granting the motion.11 However, if the
trial judge instead denies the motion to dismiss for FNC, no immediate

4. It is important to note that most states also have some form of the FNC doctrine and,
while many states mirror the federal doctrine in their own law, FNC is not uniform at the state
level. See GARY B. BORN & PETER B. RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES COURTS 356–57 (6th ed. 2018) (noting that all states except Montana, which has
rejected the doctrine, and Idaho and Oregon, which have not formally adopted the doctrine,
incorporate the FNC doctrine into state law through cases or statutes that mirror the federal
common law doctrine or that include modifications to make state law more stringent than the
federal FNC analysis). When this Note discusses the FNC doctrine, it exclusively refers to the
uniform federal standard.
5. See id. at 347 (noting that, under the FNC doctrine, “a U.S. court may dismiss an action
(otherwise within its jurisdiction) in favor of a substantially more convenient and appropriate
foreign forum”).
6. Id. at 349.
7. See RONALD A. BRAND & SCOTT R. JABLONSKI, FORUM NON CONVENIENS: HISTORY,
GLOBAL PRACTICE, AND FUTURE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON CHOICE OF COURT
AGREEMENTS 38 (2007) (noting that use of the FNC doctrine by U.S. courts can be traced as far
back as the year 1801).
8. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1430–31 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(highlighting the continuing availability of the FNC doctrine to dismiss transnational litigation
from U.S. courts).
9. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens on Appeal: The Case for
Interlocutory Review, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 445, 446 (2012) (noting that a district court has discretion
to dismiss a case under the FNC doctrine).
10. See MICHAEL KARAYANNI, FORUM NON CONVENIENS IN THE MODERN AGE: A
COMPARATIVE AND METHODOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW 49 (2004)
(identifying that a dismissal for FNC is subject to appellate review).
11. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981) (“The forum non conveniens
determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only
when there has been a clear abuse of discretion . . . .”).
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appeal as of right is permitted; the movant only has a right to raise the
issue on appeal following a final judgment.12
This dichotomy in appealability as of right for FNC rulings arises
from the Supreme Court’s decision in Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard.13 In
Biard, the Court held that denials of motions to dismiss for FNC do not
fall within the collateral order doctrine—a narrow exception to the
final judgment rule that permits appellate review of certain
interlocutory orders.14 Consequently, litigants, like those in Gonzalez,
may proceed through the time and expense of discovery, motion
practice, and trial only to be kicked out of the U.S. legal system on
appeal.15
Yet few parties will ever successfully obtain reversal by an
appellate court of a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for
FNC after trial on the case’s merits.16 This is not because erroneous
denials of motions to dismiss do not occur; rather, numerous factors—
notably including the significant financial costs of and time involved in
litigating a case on the merits—lead the vast majority of litigants to
settle their cases before trial.17 In addition, a party challenging an FNC
denial after final judgment “must display substantial prejudice” on
appeal.18 Such prejudice cannot be shown when the moving party is
otherwise successful on the merits during the appeal.19 Consequently,
“review after final judgment is ineffective to vindicate a wrongfully
denied motion for FNC.”20
12. See Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529 (1988) (indicating that denials of
motions to dismiss for FNC are “unsuited for immediate appeal as of right”).
13. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517 (1988).
14. Id. at 530 (holding that the denial of a motion to dismiss for FNC is not “a collateral
order subject to appeal as a final judgment”).
15. See Gonzalez v. Naviera Neptuno A.A., 832 F.2d 876, 881 (5th Cir. 1987) (“Although . . .
a trial on the merits has occurred[,] . . . we believe Neptuno has shown sufficient prejudice to
warrant vacating that judgment and, in effect, transferring the case to Peru.”).
16. Research for this Note has identified Gonzalez as the only such instance.
17. See Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, What is the Settlement Rate and Why
Should We Care?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 111, 112 (2009) (“Casual conventional wisdom
often has it that about 95 percent of cases settle.”).
18. Yukos Capital S.A.R.L. v. Samaraneftegaz, 592 F. App’x 8, 9 (2d Cir. 2014) (citation
omitted). This standard at least requires the appellant to illustrate the content of additional
evidence that would have been available in the non-U.S. forum and how the use of that evidence
may have changed the result in the case. See id. at 9–10 (determining that appellant “failed to
demonstrate the prejudice necessary to challenge the forum non conveniens ruling” because
appellant did not “proffer[] what testimony [a witness unable to testify in the U.S. forum] might
have given or how that testimony might have affected the case’s outcome”).
19. Indasu Int’l, C.A. v. Citibank, N.A., 861 F.2d 375, 380 (2d Cir. 1988).
20. In re Lloyd’s Register N. Am., Inc., 780 F.3d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 2015).
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Further, parties are rarely able to seek immediate appellate review
of a denied motion to dismiss for FNC before final judgment.21
Defendants in the Gonzalez case sought such review through a
certification for interlocutory appeal and a writ of mandamus.22 Both
efforts were unsuccessful,23 and this is the norm for defendants seeking
immediate appellate review of a denied FNC motion.24
The dichotomy in the availability of prompt appellate review for
FNC decisions has particular salience in the context of transnational
litigation, where forum selection concerns are particularly acute.25 This
Note adopts a working definition of transnational litigation as “cases
involving foreign parties, foreign harms, or foreign law.”26 In
transnational cases, the choice of forum is highly contested because
different forums can substantially affect the outcome of a case on its
merits.27 Numerous reasons exist for the impact of various forums on
transnational litigation, including that rules governing procedure,
substance, and choice of law differ far more significantly across
countries than they do across U.S. states.28 Moreover, differences in
political and socioeconomic backgrounds of lawyers and courts are
more pronounced in the transnational setting, as are risks of forum bias
and concurrent litigation proceedings.29 Finally, judgment enforcement
can be more difficult in the transnational litigation context than when
litigating within a single domestic jurisdiction.30
Additionally, forum selection for transnational litigation is
especially important when one of the potential forums is a U.S. federal
court.31 Jury trials, contingency fees, broad discovery, high damages
awards (including punitive damages), and the fact that each party
typically covers its own attorneys’ fees are all distinguishing features of

21. Id.
22. Gonzalez v. Naviera Neptuno A.A., 832 F.2d 876, 877–78 (5th Cir. 1987).
23. Id.
24. Robertson, supra note 9, at 470 (noting that certification and mandamus are “only rarely
applied in forum non conveniens cases”). Certification and mandamus are discussed in-depth
within Part II.
25. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 3.
26. Maggie Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 390, 391 (2017).
27. See Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conveniens and the Redundancy of Court-Access
Doctrine, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 781, 783 (1985) (“The choice of forum has thus become a key
strategic battle fought to increase the chances of prevailing on the merits.”).
28. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 3.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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litigation in a U.S. forum compared to litigation elsewhere in the
world.32 These characteristics tend to be plaintiff friendly,33 and they
have resulted in the general idea that “[a]s a moth is drawn to the light,
so is a litigant drawn to the United States. If he can only get his case
into their courts, he stands to win a fortune.”34
Yet the Supreme Court has recently made it tougher for
transnational litigation to proceed in U.S. federal courts.35 For
example, the Supreme Court has restricted the extraterritorial reach of
numerous federal statutes, tightened the requirements for personal
jurisdiction over foreign defendants, and heightened the pleading
standards required of plaintiffs, all of which help to limit transnational
litigation in U.S. federal courts.36 The FNC doctrine remains a key tool
for defendants seeking the dismissal of complaints with extensive
foreign connections, but the Supreme Court has not altered the
landscape of appellate review for FNC motions in its recent decisions
despite otherwise increasing restrictions on transnational litigation.
This Note argues that the Supreme Court should reverse its
current doctrine to allow for immediate appeals as of right from orders
denying motions to dismiss for FNC. Doing so would be in line with
the Court’s current jurisprudential trends restricting transnational
litigation in U.S. federal courts. Immediate appellate review would also
further the policy rationales—including respect for the separation of
powers, adherence to general principles of international comity, and
concerns about litigation fairness and efficiency—underlying recent
Supreme Court decisions in this area.
This argument contributes to the burgeoning academic discussion
surrounding transnational litigation in U.S. courts37—a conversation
32. Id. at 3–4.
33. Id. at 3.
34. Smith Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Bloch [1983] 1 W.L.R. 730 (AC) at 733 (Eng.).
35. See GEORGE T. CONWAY, III, JOHN BELLINGER, III, R. REEVES ANDERSON & JAMES
L. STENGEL, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, FEDERAL CASES FROM FOREIGN
PLACES: HOW THE SUPREME COURT HAS LIMITED FOREIGN DISPUTES FROM FLOODING U.S.
COURTS 1 (2014) (“Recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court . . . have cut back
attempts to involve U.S. courts in controversies with minimal, if any, connection to the United
States.”).
36. See id. at 1, 42 (identifying that recent Supreme Court decisions have restricted
extraterritoriality and utilized tougher jurisdiction and pleading standards to limit transnational
litigation in U.S. federal courts).
37. See generally Donald Earl Childress III, Escaping Federal Law in Transnational Cases:
The Brave New World of Transnational Litigation, 93 N.C. L. REV. 995 (2015) (highlighting an
increasing reluctance by U.S. courts to hear transnational cases); John F. Coyle, The Case for
Writing International Law into the U.S. Code, 56 B.C. L. REV. 433 (2015) (discussing the U.S.
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with important global implications for litigants, lawyers, and the legal
profession. This Note engages with this dialogue by taking the Supreme
Court’s recent jurisprudence and supporting policy rationales as a
given while suggesting an additional mechanism by which the Court
could further its stated goal of limiting transnational litigation:
reforming the appellate regime for denied motions to dismiss for FNC.
The Note proceeds in five substantive parts. Part I outlines and
provides the policy rationales for the FNC doctrine, the final judgment
rule, and the collateral order exception to the final judgment rule. Part
I also presents the Supreme Court’s Biard decision, which combined
these doctrines to hold that denied motions to dismiss for FNC are not
immediately appealable as of right. Part II critiques the appellate
framework resulting from the Biard decision by detailing the failures
of the current regime for appealing FNC denials. Part III then
illustrates the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence restricting
transnational litigation in U.S. federal courts. Part IV follows by
arguing that reversing Biard and allowing immediate appeals from
FNC denials fits within this trend and supports the separation of
powers, comity, fairness, and efficiency values used by the Court to
justify restrictions on transnational litigation. Part V responds to
potential counterarguments to this proposal.
I. FORUM NON CONVENIENS, THE FINAL JUDGMENT RULE, AND
THE COLLATERAL ORDER EXCEPTION: A PRIMER ON THE
DOCTRINES AND THE BIARD HOLDING
The current appellate framework for denied motions to dismiss
for FNC results from the interplay of various doctrines and case law.
The FNC doctrine allows a federal court to dismiss a case from the U.S.
legal system in favor of a more convenient foreign jurisdiction. The
final judgment rule prevents interlocutory orders in a case from being
immediately appealed to an appellate court unless the order falls
within the collateral order exception to the rule. The Supreme Court
held in Biard that denied FNC motions do not fall within the exception,
thereby resulting in the dichotomous appellate framework for motions

judiciary’s perceived retreat from international law and its effect for litigants seeking to use U.S.
courts as a litigation forum); Maggie Gardner, Parochial Procedure, 69 STAN. L. REV. 941 (2017)
(discussing the use of parochial procedures favoring U.S. parties in U.S. courts); Austen L.
Parrish, Fading Extraterritoriality and Isolationism? Developments in the United States, 24 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 207 (2017) (opining on the conventional perspective that U.S. courts are
limiting transnational litigation).
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to dismiss for FNC. This Part details these doctrines, the policy
rationales for each, and the facts and holding of the Biard case as
background on current law and concludes by highlighting how lower
courts have criticized the Supreme Court’s approach and holding in
Biard.
A. The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine
Forum non conveniens is designed “to respond to those limited
instances in which the plaintiff’s chosen forum was highly inconvenient,
either from the perspective of the defendant or the chosen forum.”38 In
the federal court system, the FNC doctrine is part of federal procedural
common law.39 When invoked, the doctrine serves as a mechanism to
dismiss a case from the U.S. legal system.40
The Supreme Court’s decision in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno41
outlines the doctrine as it stands today.42 As articulated in Piper,
conducting an FNC analysis is a two-step process43 left to the discretion
of the district court judge and subject to the abuse of discretion
standard of appellate review.44 The first step in the FNC analysis is to
ask whether an adequate alternative forum is available.45 Being
“amenable to process” in another jurisdiction will ordinarily satisfy the
requirement.46 But even if a party is amenable to process in another
jurisdiction, the alternative forum may still be deemed inadequate if no
satisfactory remedy is available.47 A lack of satisfactory remedy
includes, but is not limited to, situations where the forum forbids
litigation over the dispute’s subject matter.48 Notably, the mere fact

38. JOACHIM ZEKOLL, MICHAEL COLLINS & GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, TRANSNATIONAL
CIVIL LITIGATION 371 (2013).
39. See id. at 393 (“The forum non conveniens principles . . . are generally thought to be
procedural principles applied in the federal courts, as a matter of federal common law.”).
40. Id. at 372.
41. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
42. See BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 356 (noting that Piper Aircraft “is the leading
contemporary statement of the forum non conveniens doctrine”).
43. BRAND & JABLONSKI, supra note 7, at 73.
44. See Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 257 (“The forum non conveniens determination is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only when there has been
a clear abuse of discretion . . . .”).
45. See id. at 254 n.22 (“At the outset of any forum non conveniens inquiry, the court must
determine whether there exists an alternative forum.”).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
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that the law in the alternative forum may be less favorable to the
plaintiff is not enough to deem the forum inadequate.49 Similarly, a
change in law favorable to the movant, even when the movant engages
in “reverse forum-shopping” and purposely seeks more favorable law
through an FNC motion, should not be considered in the FNC
analysis.50 If there is no adequate alternative forum available, the
motion to dismiss for FNC will be denied and the litigation will
continue.51
If an adequate alternative forum does exist, the inquiry proceeds
to the second step of the FNC analysis, which is a balancing of public
and private interest factors.52 Private interest factors include: “the
relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory
process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining
attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises . . . ; and
all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious
and inexpensive.”53 Public interest factors include:
the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the local
interest in having localized controversies decided at home; the
interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home
with the law that must govern the action; the avoidance of
unnecessary problems in conflict of laws, or in the application of
foreign law; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated
forum with jury duty.54

In balancing the public and private interest factors, no single factor
is dispositive.55 Further, deference is owed to the plaintiff’s choice of
forum, which is assumed to be convenient,56 although foreign plaintiffs

49. See id. at 247 (“The Court of Appeals erred in holding that plaintiffs may defeat a motion
to dismiss on the ground of forum non conveniens merely by showing that the substantive law that
would be applied in the alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiffs than that of the present
forum.”).
50. Id. at 252 n.19.
51. See BRAND & JABLONSKI, supra note 7, at 73 (noting that proof of an adequate
alternative forum is required first before continuing to the second step of the FNC analysis).
52. See id. (identifying that “a balancing of private and public interest factors to determine
the most appropriate forum” comes after concluding that an adequate alternative forum is
available).
53. Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 241 n.6 (citation omitted).
54. Id. (citation omitted).
55. See id. at 249–50 (“If central emphasis were placed on any one factor, the forum non
conveniens doctrine would lose much of the very flexibility that makes it so valuable.”).
56. Id. at 255–56.
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receive less deference than citizens or residents of the forum.57 That
said, dismissal is possible even from a plaintiff’s home forum when
public and private interest factors suggest that litigation in the forum
would overly burden the defendant or court.58 The FNC inquiry is
ultimately focused on convenience;59 dismissal for FNC may therefore
be granted when a plaintiff chooses a forum only for its favorable law,
or merely to annoy a defendant, rather than for the forum’s
convenience.60
The FNC analysis is a fact-intensive inquiry designed to afford
flexibility to judges.61 Because the FNC issue can be decided before
addressing whether jurisdiction is proper,62 district court judges can
promptly dismiss cases without expending unnecessary time and
resources. Further, a court can impose conditions on FNC dismissals to
ensure that the alternative forum is truly adequate.63 Such conditions
often include requirements that the movant accept jurisdiction in the
alternative forum or agree to pay any judgment that the foreign
jurisdiction renders.64 If the conditions are not met, or the alternative
forum refuses to accept the case, the litigation returns to the U.S. trial
court.65
The Supreme Court has fashioned the FNC doctrine to consider
“interests of justice.”66 The Court has noted the attractiveness of U.S.
courts to foreign plaintiffs and highlighted that, on a systemic level,
docket congestion would only increase in already-crowded U.S. courts
without dismissals based on FNC.67 At the same time, the doctrine
“represents a clear choice for equity over efficiency [in individual

57. Id. at 255 n.23.
58. Id.
59. See id. at 248–49 (noting that a previous Supreme Court case held “that the central focus
of the forum non conveniens inquiry is convenience”).
60. Id. at 249 n.15.
61. See id. at 249–50 (“[E]ach case turns on its facts. If central emphasis were placed on any
one factor, the forum non conveniens doctrine would lose much of the very flexibility that makes
it so valuable.” (citation omitted)).
62. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 425 (2007) (“We hold
that . . . a court need not resolve whether it has authority to adjudicate the cause (subject-matter
jurisdiction) or personal jurisdiction over the defendant if it determines that, in any event, a
foreign tribunal is plainly the more suitable arbiter of the merits of the case.”).
63. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 413.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 254.
67. Id. at 251–52.
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cases], and for fairness in a particular case over predictability of
procedural status.”68 The doctrine also serves to promote various
additional interests, including the efficient and fair use of U.S. domestic
legal resources, the avoidance of inappropriately expansive potential
liability for U.S. defendants, and paying deference to the interests and
policies of foreign forums.69
B. The Final Judgment Rule and Its Collateral Order Exception
Under the final judgment rule, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1291,70 the
courts of appeals “have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions
of the district courts of the United States.”71 Notably, a district court
decision is “final” when it “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves
nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.”72 Consequently,
an order from the district court granting a motion to dismiss for FNC
is immediately appealable—it ends the litigation in the district court.
But a district court order denying a motion to dismiss for FNC is not
immediately appealable because the parties are free to continue the
litigation.73
The rationales for the final judgment rule are straightforward. The
rule allows for comprehensive review upon final judgment of different
stages of the litigation’s proceedings.74 Further, the rule prevents
piecemeal appellate review of litigation from clogging the legal
system.75 The final judgment rule is therefore an outgrowth of
Congress’s desire to avoid the inefficiencies and excess costs that result
from repeated, frivolous, or unnecessary appeals in the federal courts.76

68. BRAND & JABLONSKI, supra note 7, at 73.
69. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 369–70.
70. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2018). The statute applies to all federal courts of appeals other than
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Id.
71. Id. (emphasis added).
72. Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (citation omitted).
73. See ZEKOLL et al., supra note 38, at 394 (“[O]nly the granting (but not the denial) of a
motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds is immediately appealable under the final
judgment rule, 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”).
74. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
75. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974).
76. See Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006) (noting that policy interests underlying
§ 1291 include “the sensible policy of avoid[ing] the obstruction to just claims that would come
from permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of separate appeals from the various
rulings to which a litigation may give rise” (citations omitted)).

EIBLE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1204

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/19/2019 3:40 PM

[Vol. 68:1193

The collateral order doctrine is a judicially developed exception to
the final judgment rule.77 The doctrine allows immediate appeals as of
right from interlocutory orders that “fall in that small class which
finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to,
rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too
independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration
be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.”78 The doctrine
constitutes an effort to read § 1291 practically, rather than technically.79
It is worth emphasizing that the class of decisions covered by the
collateral order doctrine is narrow. The Court has held that “[t]o come
within the ‘small class’ of decisions excepted from the final-judgment
rule . . . the order must [1] conclusively determine the disputed
question, [2] resolve an important issue completely separate from the
merits of the action, and [3] be effectively unreviewable on appeal from
a final judgment.”80 The Court has noted that these conditions are
“stringent” so that the collateral order exception does not overpower
the final judgment rule.81
The policy rationale favoring the collateral order doctrine is
clear—some interlocutory orders are on issues so important, yet
distinct from the case’s merits, that requiring a party to wait until after
a final judgment to appeal the order effectively extinguishes the right
at issue.82 Under this rationale, denied motions to dismiss for FNC, as
a class, are a prime candidate for immediate appellate review as of
right. Forcing a movant to wait until after final judgment for review of
the issue virtually destroys the movant’s right to litigate in an
appropriate forum. But, as explained below, the Supreme Court
rejected this rationale in Biard, holding that the denial of a motion to
dismiss for FNC does not fall within the collateral order exception to
the final judgment rule.83

77. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467–68 (1978) (noting that the Court
had developed the “exception” in a previous decision); Bryan Lammon, Rules, Standards, and
Experimentation in Appellate Jurisdiction, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 423, 426–27 (2013) (identifying the
collateral order doctrine as “one of the existing judicial exceptions to the final judgment rule”).
78. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
79. See id. (“The Court has long given this provision of the statute this practical rather than
a technical construction.” (citations omitted)).
80. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468.
81. Will, 546 U.S. at 349–50.
82. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
83. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 530 (1988).
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C. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard
The basic facts of Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard are straightforward.
Biard, a resident of Belgium, filed a civil suit in U.S. district court
against Van Cauwenberghe, also a Belgian resident, over a defaulted
loan relating to a U.S. mortgage.84 Biard asserted claims under federal
statutory law, the common law of fraud, and other provisions of state
law.85 Van Cauwenberghe moved to dismiss the civil suit for FNC, but
the district court summarily denied the motion.86 The court of appeals
affirmed this decision “in a one-line order” citing precedent on the
collateral order doctrine, and the Supreme Court then granted
certiorari.87
The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s decision denying
Van Cauwenberghe an immediate appeal as of right from his denied
motion to dismiss for FNC.88 In doing so, the Court concluded “that the
question of the convenience of the forum is not completely separate
from the merits of the action[] . . . and thus is not immediately
appealable as of right.”89 Step two of the FNC analysis asks district
courts to identify whether the chosen forum is inconvenient enough to
warrant dismissal.90 Because that assessment—which involves
reviewing a party’s ability to access evidence, determining the
availability of witnesses, and assessing the forum’s interest in deciding
the controversy—requires the district court to engage with the merits
of the parties’ dispute at the FNC stage, the denial of an FNC motion
does not fall into the collateral order exception.91
The Court did concede that “[i]t is . . . undoubtedly true that in
certain cases, the [FNC] determination will not require significant
inquiry into the facts and legal issues presented by a case, and an
immediate appeal might result in substantial savings of time and
expense for both the litigants and the courts.”92 Yet the Court made
clear that it considers categories of cases, and not individual disputes,

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 519–20.
Id. at 520.
Id. at 521.
Id.
Id. at 530.
Id. at 527 (citation omitted).
Id. at 528.
Id. at 528–29.
Id. at 529.
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when determining appealability under § 1291.93 Ultimately, the Court
“believe[d] that in the main, the issues that arise in forum non
conveniens determinations will substantially overlap factual and legal
issues of the underlying dispute, making such determinations unsuited
for immediate appeal as of right under § 1291.”94
The Court’s decision in Biard was not inevitable. The Fourth
Circuit had previously held that denials of motions to dismiss for FNC
were immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine,95 and
some state courts had as well.96 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s
rationale has been subsequently criticized. The Third Circuit noted in
dictum that the Supreme Court has been inconsistent when discussing
the FNC doctrine, because “in a context other than the collateral-order
doctrine . . . the Supreme Court . . . ha[s] held forum non conveniens
dismissals not to be rulings on the merits.”97
The Supreme Court has responded to these critiques by agreeing
that, generally, “[a] forum non conveniens dismissal den[ies] audience
to a case on the merits.”98 The Court maintains that this is consistent
with Biard, which only focused on the FNC doctrine in the collateral
order context.99 According to the Court, Biard’s observation about
overlap between factual and legal issues within the FNC doctrine
“makes eminent sense when the question is whether an issue is so
discrete from the merits as to justify departure from the rule that a
party may not appeal until the district court has rendered a final
judgment disassociating itself from the case.”100
In short, the Supreme Court has concluded that the FNC doctrine
does not generally involve the merits of a case, but the doctrine is
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See Hodson v. A.H. Robins Co., 715 F.2d 142, 145 n.2 (4th Cir. 1988) (reaching the merits
on appeal of a district court judge’s order denying a motion to dismiss for FNC after concluding
“that all of the requirements of the rule of Cohen . . . are present”).
96. See Wyeth Labs., Inc. v. Jefferson, 725 A.2d 487, 495 (D.C. 1999) (indicating that
reversals of orders denying motions to dismiss for FNC are rare but have been permitted under
D.C. law). Note that Washington, D.C., would later change its law to align its procedures relating
to the FNC doctrine with those of the federal courts. See Rolinski v. Lewis, 828 A.2d 739, 742
(D.C. 2003) (overruling D.C. law allowing FNC denials to be “immediately appealable as a matter
of right under the collateral order doctrine”).
97. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp. v. Sinochem Int’l Co., 436 F.3d 349, 359 (3d Cir. 2006), rev’d,
549 U.S. 422 (2007).
98. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 432 (2007) (second
alteration in original) (citation omitted).
99. Id. at 432–33.
100. Id. at 432 (citations omitted).
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nonetheless still too involved with a case’s merits to satisfy the
collateral order doctrine’s requirement that the decision in question
“resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the
action.”101 This inconsistency in the Court’s reasoning, highlighted by
the Third Circuit,102 can be resolved by allowing for immediate appeals
as of right from denied motions to dismiss for FNC under the collateral
order doctrine.
II. FAILURES OF THE CURRENT APPELLATE REGIME FOR DENIED
MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FNC
This Part identifies the limited options available to a litigant
seeking to immediately appeal a denied motion to dismiss for FNC
following Biard and highlights the failure of each to afford any
meaningful appellate review.
Outside of the collateral order doctrine, litigants have three
potential options available for appealing an order denying a motion to
dismiss for FNC: (i) waiting until final judgment after trial to appeal
the FNC ruling; (ii) using 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to request the
certification of interlocutory review; and (iii) applying for a writ of
mandamus.103 None of these options provide effective review of a
denied motion to dismiss for FNC.
A. Appeal After Final Judgment
Waiting for final judgment to appeal an order denying a motion to
dismiss for FNC is ineffective because the movant will be unlikely to
meet the substantial prejudice standard after final judgment.104
Moreover, the work that the FNC doctrine does to avoid
inconvenience to the parties and the forum will have already been
undermined if a case makes it to final judgment,105 and remanding the
case is itself inconvenient, costly, and time consuming.106 Orders
denying motions to dismiss for FNC are consequently rarely reversed
on appeal after trial.107

101. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
102. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
103. See In re Lloyd’s Register N. Am., Inc., 780 F.3d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 2015) (discussing the
inadequacy of traditional appeals and the use of § 1292(b) while analyzing a mandamus petition).
104. Id. at 289.
105. Id. (citation omitted).
106. Robertson, supra note 9, at 457.
107. Id.
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B. Interlocutory Review Under § 1292(b)
Use of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) also fails to remedy the erroneous
denial of a motion to dismiss for FNC.108 Section 1292(b) allows for
interlocutory appeals in civil cases where an order in question
“involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from
[which] may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation.”109 Notably, the Biard court stated that “[o]ur conclusion
that the denial of a motion to dismiss on the ground of forum non
conveniens is not appealable under § 1291 is fortified by the availability
of interlocutory review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).”110 For the
Biard court, it was enough that § 1292(b) was available when
necessary.111
Time has shown that this rationale was misguided. Not only is the
statutory ground for interlocutory review under § 1292(b) narrow, but
it also requires approval from both the trial and appellate courts.112
This is no easy task, as the movant must convince the trial court that it
should allow an appeal from its own order and the appellate court that
exceptional circumstances warrant a departure from the statutory final
judgment rule.113 The appellate court may deny the request for any
reason.114 These requirements have rendered § 1292(b) ineffective for
litigants seeking interlocutory review of district court orders,115 as
certification for review under § 1292(b) occurs very infrequently.116

108. See In re Lloyd’s, 780 F.3d at 288 (arguing that interlocutory review under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b) is limited, which contributes to the lack of effective remedies for erroneous denials of
motions to dismiss for FNC).
109. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2018).
110. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529 (1988).
111. Id. at 530.
112. In re Lloyd’s, 780 F.3d at 288.
113. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 474–75 (1978).
114. Id. at 475.
115. See Adam N. Steinman, Reinventing Appellate Jurisdiction, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1245
(2007) (noting that “[s]ection 1292(b) has not been an effective method for obtaining appellate
review over interlocutory orders,” because “the certification requirement gives district courts a
veto over § 1292(b) appeals” and “the federal appellate courts have narrowly construed
§ 1292(b)’s requirements so that relatively few certified appeals are accepted”).
116. See Timothy P. Glynn, Discontent and Indiscretion: Discretionary Review of Interlocutory
Orders, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 175, 195–96 (2001) (noting that district court judges “rarely
grant certification” and that “[a]ctual appeals are even rarer, because the appellate courts refuse
to accept review of a significant percentage of certified orders”).
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More specifically, § 1292(b) is rarely utilized in FNC cases.117 An
empirical study of certification requests under § 1292(b) in the First
Circuit from 1958 to 2014 identified only two attempts to achieve
certification in FNC cases, both of which were unsuccessful.118
Similarly, a survey of certification requests in the Federal Circuit
between 1995 and 2010 identified 117 petitions under § 1292(b),119 none
of which were related to an FNC motion.120 Moreover, there is good
reason to believe that these numbers underestimate denials of
certification—they disregard petitions denied at the district court level,
and decisions denying certification are rarely reported.121
Ultimately, a movant will rarely obtain reversal of a denied FNC
motion under § 1292(b). It appears that, in the three decades since
Biard, only two decisions have been reported in which courts granted
§ 1292(b) petitions and reversed denials of motions to dismiss for
FNC.122 Consequently, the Supreme Court’s confidence that § 1292(b)
can serve as a mechanism for appealing erroneous denials of motions
to dismiss for FNC has proven to be unfounded.
C. A Writ of Mandamus
Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy123 rarely applied in FNC
cases.124 Congress has codified the availability of the writ of mandamus
at 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a): “The Supreme Court and all courts established
by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid
of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and
principles of law.”125 The Supreme Court has highlighted that the writ

117. Robertson, supra note 9, at 470.
118. Tony Weigand, Discretionary Interlocutory Appeals Under 28 U.S.C. 1292(b): A First
Circuit Survey and Review, 19 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 183, 250, 252 (2014).
119. Alexandra B. Hess, Stephanie L. Parker & Tala K. Toufanian, Permissive Interlocutory
Appeals at the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Fifteen Years in Review (1995-2010), 60
AM. U. L. REV. 757, 764 (2011).
120. See id. app. at 785–843 (identifying the 117 total § 1292(b) petitions considered by the
Federal Circuit between 1995 and 2010).
121. Weigand, supra note 118, at 220.
122. See Figueiredo Ferraz E Engenharia de Projeto Ltda. v. Republic of Peru, 665 F.3d 384,
386, 388–89 (2d Cir. 2011) (remanding a case to the district court with instructions to dismiss for
FNC after receiving the case on appeal under § 1292(b)); Ford v. Brown, 319 F.3d 1302, 1304 (11th
Cir. 2003) (same).
123. PETER W. LOW, JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR. & CURTIS A. BRADLEY, FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 721 (8th ed. 2014).
124. Robertson, supra note 9, at 470.
125. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2018).
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of mandamus is “a drastic and extraordinary remedy reserved for really
extraordinary causes,” which includes “only exceptional circumstances
amounting to a judicial usurpation of power[] . . . or a clear abuse of
discretion.”126
Given that mandamus “is one of the most potent weapons in the
judicial arsenal,” the Supreme Court has required three necessary
conditions before the writ can be issued.127 First, there must be no other
adequate means of relief available.128 Second, the petitioner must prove
a “clear and indisputable” right to mandamus.129 Finally, the issuing
court must believe mandamus is appropriate.130 In short, while
mandamus is technically available in FNC cases,131 such relief is
extraordinarily rare.132
The complete menu of available relief for litigants seeking to
appeal the denial of a motion to dismiss for FNC is therefore very
unappealing: neither seeking mandamus, asking for certification under
§ 1292(b), nor waiting until after final judgment on the merits are likely
to offer an adequate means of review, and immediate appellate review
of the decision under the collateral order doctrine is foreclosed by
Biard.
III. CURRENT TRENDS LIMITING TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN
U.S. FEDERAL COURTS
As a consequence of both the final judgment rule and the lack of
meaningful alternatives for obtaining immediate appellate review of
denied motions to dismiss for FNC, some transnational cases inevitably
proceed in the U.S. legal system when they should never have been
litigated in a U.S. forum. Despite this unique treatment of FNC
motions, the Supreme Court has otherwise sought to restrict
transnational litigation in the federal courts. This Part uses examples
from the Court’s recent case law on the presumption against

126. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (citations omitted).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 380–81 (citation omitted).
129. Id. at 381 (citation omitted).
130. Id. (citation omitted).
131. See In re Lloyd’s Register N. Am., Inc., 780 F.3d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 2015) (granting a writ
of mandamus where a motion to dismiss for FNC was erroneously denied “without written or oral
explanation”).
132. Robertson, supra note 9, at 470.
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extraterritoriality, personal jurisdiction, and pleading standards to
illustrate this trend.
Overall, growing evidence suggests that U.S. courts, and
particularly the Supreme Court, are becoming increasingly hostile to
transnational litigation.133 Scholars have offered numerous theories for
this development, including an increased sense of sovereignty,134 “an
emerging market for transnational law”135 in which U.S. courts are
becoming less attractive and foreign forums are becoming increasingly
hospitable to transnational cases,136 and a general concern that U.S.
taxpayer–funded resources are being used for court cases with limited
or no connection to the United States.137 The Supreme Court has
reformed both substantive and procedural law as part of this increasing
hostility to transnational litigation,138 and immediate appeals from
FNC denials would be consistent with this aversion.
While scholar Maggie Gardner has suggested that the Court’s
recent jurisprudence is reason enough to eliminate the FNC doctrine
entirely,139 this Note instead argues that the current landscape of
transnational litigation provides justification for the Supreme Court to
reform the collateral order doctrine to include denials of motions to
dismiss for FNC. Immediate appeals as of right from denied FNC
motions would help further the Supreme Court’s chosen policy of
limiting transnational litigation in U.S. federal courts by dismissing
more cases from the U.S. legal system before those cases are
adjudicated on the merits.

133. Pamela K. Bookman, Litigation Isolationism, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1081, 1088 (2015).
134. Jodie A. Kirshner, Why is the U.S. Abdicating the Policing of Multinational Corporations
to Europe?: Extraterritoriality, Sovereignty, and the Alien Tort Statute, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L L.
259, 292, 294–95 (2012) (identifying attitudes toward sovereignty and a sentiment of “integrity
anxiety” as impacting U.S. resistance to transnational litigation and international law).
135. Bookman, supra note 133, at 1085.
136. See Marcus S. Quintanilla & Christopher A. Whytock, The New Multipolarity in
Transnational Litigation: Foreign Courts, Foreign Judgments, and Foreign Law, 18 SW. J. INT’L L.
31, 33 (2011) (“[T]he United States is no longer as attractive to litigants as it supposedly once was,
and . . . other countries will increasingly draw litigants to their courts through a combination of ex
ante forum selection agreements and ex post forum shopping.”).
137. See Maya Steinitz, The Case for an International Court of Civil Justice, 67 STAN. L. REV.
ONLINE 75, 78 (2014) (identifying “the notions that U.S. courts are funded by American taxpayers
and that jury pools, too, are a limited resource to be preserved for American plaintiffs” as
“rationales for why American courts are disinclined to hear cases brought by foreign plaintiffs”).
138. See CONWAY, III ET AL., supra note 35, at 1–2 (highlighting that U.S. courts are
restricting transnational litigation on statutory and procedural grounds).
139. Gardner, supra note 26, at 399.
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A. Expansion of the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
A prominent example of the Supreme Court’s recent skepticism
toward transnational litigation is its expansion of the presumption
against extraterritoriality. The presumption is a canon of statutory
interpretation that limits the reach of federal statutes beyond U.S.
territory.140 The “presumption had all but been given up for dead”
through the 1980s, but recent cases invoking the presumption have
served to “foreclose[] a large amount of transnational litigation that
had formerly been taken for granted, including suits by U.S.
plaintiffs.”141 These cases include Morrison v. National Australia Bank
Ltd.,142 which applied the presumption to securities fraud actions,143
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,144 which applied the presumption
to the Alien Tort Statute (ATS),145 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European
Community,146 which indicated that the presumption applied to certain
portions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO),147 and Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC,148 which extended Kiobel to
categorically foreclose the possibility of suing foreign corporations
under the ATS.149
RJR Nabisco identifies the robust process a court must now follow
when determining whether a statute has extraterritorial reach: “At the
first step, we ask whether the presumption against extraterritoriality
has been rebutted—that is, whether the statute gives a clear,

140. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (“It is a longstanding
principle of American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant
to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. This principle represents a
canon of construction . . . rather than a limit upon Congress’s power to legislate.” (citations
omitted)).
141. Bookman, supra note 133, at 1098–99.
142. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
143. Id. at 265 (“In short, there is no affirmative indication in the Exchange Act that § 10(b)
applies extraterritorially, and we therefore conclude that it does not.”).
144. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013).
145. Id. at 117 (“The principles underlying the presumption against extraterritoriality thus
constrain courts exercising their power under the ATS.”). The ATS states that “[t]he district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018).
146. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016).
147. Id. at 2101 (“[W]e find that the presumption against extraterritoriality has been
rebutted—but only with respect to certain applications of the statute.”).
148. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386 (2018).
149. Id. at 1407 (“[T]he Court holds that foreign corporations may not be defendants in suits
brought under the ATS.”).
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affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially.”150 If Congress
has shown such intent in the statute, then the statute (or the relevant
provisions) apply extraterritorially.151 However,
[i]f the statute is not extraterritorial, then at the second step we
determine whether the case involves a domestic application of the
statute, and we do this by looking to the statute’s “focus.” If the
conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States,
then the case involves a permissible domestic application even if other
conduct occurred abroad; but if the conduct relevant to the focus
occurred in a foreign country, then the case involves an impermissible
extraterritorial application regardless of any other conduct that
occurred in U.S. territory.152

The outcome of this recent “retreat to territoriality” by the
Supreme Court has not been lost on litigants and commentators.153
“Lower courts are taking the directive seriously, applying the doctrine
to other areas long thought to defeat the presumption, including . . .
federal criminal law.”154 Practitioners have argued that Morrison
“revolutionized” the federal courts’ handling of litigation involving
U.S. securities laws because, among other things, it “categorically
extinguished” securities cases involving foreign plaintiffs, foreign
defendants, and foreign conduct (“foreign-cubed” cases) from U.S.
federal courts.155 Together, Morrison, Kiobel, RJR Nabisco, and Jesner
illustrate a clear trend by the Supreme Court to curb the ability of
transnational litigation to proceed in U.S. federal courts.
B. Narrowed Availability of Personal Jurisdiction
This trend is also evident in the Supreme Court’s recent approach
to personal jurisdiction, which “involves the power of a court to
adjudicate a claim against the defendant’s person and to render a
judgment enforceable against the defendant and any of its assets.”156
Personal jurisdiction has both statutory and constitutional elements;
the latter is further divided into “general” and “specific” jurisdiction.157

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101.
Id.
Id.
Bookman, supra note 133, at 1098.
Id. at 1099.
CONWAY, III ET AL., supra note 35, at 4 (citation omitted).
BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 79.
Id. at 79–82, 88.
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General jurisdiction “permits a court to adjudicate any claim against a
defendant.”158 Specific jurisdiction “permits only the adjudication of
claims that are related to or arise out of a defendant’s contacts with the
forum state.”159 Only one of the two constitutional forms of personal
jurisdiction is required to proceed with litigation.160
The Supreme Court narrowed the availability of general
jurisdiction in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown161 and
Daimler AG v. Bauman.162 Prior to these decisions, the standard had
been one of reasonableness—general jurisdiction existed when a
defendant had “sufficiently continuous and systematic” contacts with a
forum.163 Now, however, a court only has general jurisdiction over a
defendant if the defendant’s “affiliations with the State are so
continuous and systematic as to render [the defendant] essentially at
home in the forum State.”164 This curtails the number of forums to
which a defendant can be subject to general jurisdiction, and “[f]or
many corporate defendants, this has reduced their susceptibility to suit
from just about everywhere to only the forums where they are
incorporated and perhaps where they have their principal place of
business.”165 This stricter test renders U.S. courts unable to exert
general jurisdiction over many foreign defendants at all.166
The Supreme Court has similarly narrowed the standard for
specific jurisdiction.167 The J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro168
case evidences this trend. There, a plurality of the Court explained that
“[a]s a general rule, the exercise of judicial power is not lawful unless
158. Id. at 88.
159. Id.
160. See Bookman, supra note 133, at 1092–93 (noting that specific jurisdiction over a
defendant may still be available even when general jurisdiction is not).
161. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 918, 927 (2011)
(rejecting general jurisdiction in a transnational litigation case based on a stream of commerce
theory regarding the limited flow of products from foreign subsidiaries of a U.S. company into a
U.S. forum).
162. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 120–21, 139 (2014) (rejecting general jurisdiction
in a transnational litigation case with a foreign plaintiff, foreign defendant, and foreign injury
where jurisdiction was asserted based solely on the contacts of the foreign company’s U.S.
subsidiary with the chosen U.S. forum).
163. Bookman, supra note 133, at 1091–92.
164. Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (citation omitted).
165. Gardner, supra note 26, at 432 (citations omitted).
166. Id.
167. See id. at 433 (highlighting that “the Court’s jurisprudence . . . ha[s] checked exorbitant
invocations of specific jurisdiction as well”).
168. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).

EIBLE IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

MAKING FNC CONVENIENT AGAIN

2/19/2019 3:40 PM

1215

the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws.”169 Applying this standard, the Court refused to
find jurisdiction over a foreign defendant whose product caused injury
to a New Jersey plaintiff in New Jersey because, despite targeting the
United States generally for placement of its products, the defendant
had not purposely availed itself of the New Jersey market
specifically.170 For the Court, “personal jurisdiction requires a forumby-forum, or sovereign-by-sovereign, analysis.”171 Consequently,
“[b]ecause the United States is a distinct sovereign, a defendant may in
principle be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States
but not of any particular State.”172
The McIntyre case has been described by one scholar as
“territoriality on steroids, fetishizing the concept of a purposeful
contact with a specific sovereign (and its territory) such that even harm
in a particular territory is insufficient to support jurisdiction without
accompanying targeted contacts with that sovereign.”173 But whether
one agrees with the outcome in McIntyre or not, it is clear that, along
with recent restrictions on general jurisdiction, this narrowing of
specific jurisdiction increases the likelihood that a court will not have
the power to hear a transnational case, thereby limiting transnational
litigation in U.S. federal courts.
C. Heightened Pleading Standards
Finally, the Supreme Court has limited transnational litigation in
U.S. courts by heightening pleading standards from notice pleading to
plausibility pleading.174 To properly state a claim in federal court,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires that a pleading need
only include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.”175 This requirement gained the moniker
“notice pleading” after the Supreme Court’s decision in Conley v.

169. Id. at 877–78 (plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
170. See id. at 878, 885–86 (detailing the facts of the case and identifying that the defendant
had marketed to the United States generally but not to New Jersey specifically).
171. Id. at 884.
172. Id.
173. Bookman, supra note 133, at 1093.
174. See CONWAY, III ET AL., supra note 35, at 42 (highlighting the Supreme Court’s change
in pleading requirements as limiting the ability to bring transnational claims in U.S. courts).
175. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
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Gibson,176 which stated that “all the Rules require is a short and plain
statement of the claim that will give the defendant fair notice of what
the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”177 The
Supreme Court changed course fifty years later in Bell Atlantic Corp.
v. Twombly,178 where it adopted a “plausibility” standard, holding that
“we do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only
enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” and
stated that this requires a plaintiff to “nudge[] their claims across the
line from conceivable to plausible.”179 The Court expanded this
standard beyond Twombly’s specific factual context180 two years later
by concluding, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,181 that plausibility pleading
requirements apply to all civil actions.182 Consequently, the heightened
pleading standards apply in transnational cases.183
Heightened pleading standards can be especially impactful in the
transnational litigation context. ATS cases, for example, are
transnational by definition, as they require an alien plaintiff, but they
also require a “violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States.”184 Plaintiffs may therefore be required to plead a violation of
the law of nations with enough particularity to satisfy plausibility
pleading requirements.185 This is a difficult task and, combined with the
additional requirements imposed by the presumption against
extraterritoriality, is likely to foreclose or dissuade foreign plaintiffs
from bringing claims under the ATS.186

176. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544 (2007).
177. Id. at 47.
178. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
179. Id. at 570.
180. See id. at 553 (“We granted certiorari to address the proper standard for pleading an
antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct and now reverse.” (emphasis added)
(citation omitted)).
181. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
182. See id. at 678 (referencing Twombly while holding that “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss,
a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face” (citation omitted)).
183. Childress III, supra note 37, at 1032.
184. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018).
185. Childress III, supra note 37, at 1033.
186. Id. at 1033–34; see also CONWAY, III ET AL., supra note 35, at 42, 43 n.12 (identifying
lower court decisions applying heightened pleading standards to dismiss transnational cases under
the ATS and RICO).
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D. Supreme Court Justifications for Restricting Transnational
Litigation Support Strengthening the FNC Doctrine
Of course, this “restrictive ethos to federal procedural and
substantive law in transnational cases” is not immune to critique.187
Some argue that the trend heavily favors corporate defendants188—
indeed, corporations have celebrated the restrictions.189 Additionally,
the limitations leave some plaintiffs without a remedy,190 deprive U.S.
defendants of their preferred home forum, and force dispute resolution
into foreign forums, which in turn decreases U.S. influence abroad and
reduces the role played by the United States in the market for
transnational litigation and in promoting human rights.191 Foreign
states may retaliate by instituting blocking statutes or disfavoring U.S.
companies, and U.S. companies may be competitively disadvantaged
at home due to litigation costs that are increasingly irrelevant for
foreign companies.192
The Supreme Court acknowledges these criticisms but has
repeatedly found them unpersuasive. Instead, the Court has relied on
notions of litigation fairness and efficiency, separation of powers,
international comity, respect for foreign relations and sovereignty, and
concerns about forum shopping to support its current transnational
litigation jurisprudence.193 Whether or not one agrees with the
Supreme Court’s weighing of the interests when it comes to

187. Childress III, supra note 37, at 999.
188. See Bookman, supra note 133, at 1093 (noting that the outcome of McIntyre
“encourag[es] foreign companies to avoid jurisdiction by structuring their business so as not to
target individual states”); Steinitz, supra note 137, at 77 n.13 (“Domestically, Kiobel belongs to
an expanding pro-corporate-defendant jurisprudence that has characterized the Supreme Court
in recent history.”).
189. See CONWAY, III ET AL., supra note 35, at 2 (“[R]ecent decisions have given American
companies new tools to oppose the importation of foreign disputes into U.S. courts.”); id. at 42
(noting that recent trends “should help courts and defendants more efficiently weed out
international lawsuits that never should have been imported into the United States in the first
place”).
190. See Gardner, supra note 26, at 432 (“[F]oreign corporations may no longer be susceptible
to the general jurisdiction of any U.S. court.”).
191. Bookman, supra note 133, at 1124, 1127–28.
192. Id. at 1129.
193. See id. at 1100, 1123 (noting that separation of powers suggests that foreign affairs should
be left to the political branches, international comity cautions respect for the regulatory authority
of foreign states, and forum shopping creates inefficiencies that current jurisprudence redresses);
Childress III, supra note 37, at 1041–42 (highlighting concerns about excessive litigation, case
management, high costs, crowded dockets, respect for foreign policy, and a fear of “legal
imperialism” as influences on the Court’s approach to transnational litigation).
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transnational litigation, the Supreme Court is clearly charting it a
narrow path in federal courts.
Professor Gardner concludes that these doctrinal developments
affecting transnational litigation render the FNC doctrine unnecessary,
particularly given that “forum non conveniens increasingly provides
defendants with an unjustified second (or third or fourth) bite at the
apple of dismissal.”194 For Gardner, FNC “is dangerously redundant”
and should be “retire[d].”195 But consistent jurisprudence and policy
rationales favor the opposite: strengthening the doctrine’s utility by
allowing for immediate appeals as of right from denials of motions to
dismiss for FNC. Federal courts should be empowered to use the
doctrine more aggressively, along with other doctrinal tools provided
by the Supreme Court, to achieve the Court’s current preference for
limiting transnational litigation in U.S. federal courts. If defendants
receive another bite at the apple of dismissal as a result, the Supreme
Court’s reluctance to use the U.S. federal court system as a forum for
transnational litigation justifies this opportunity.
IV. INCREASING FNC’S CONVENIENCE BY OVERTURNING BIARD
This Part situates the Biard decision within the Supreme Court’s
current trend of limiting transnational litigation in U.S. federal courts.
While several methods exist for altering current doctrine to allow for
immediate appeals as of right from denied FNC motions—including
through new Supreme Court case law, Supreme Court rulemaking, or
Congressional enactment—this Part argues that directly overturning
Biard with new case law is the best option available and would allow
the Court to use the FNC doctrine as an additional tool for achieving
its stated policy objectives in restricting transnational litigation in U.S.
federal courts.
A. Overturning Biard Using New Case Law
The most promising method to alter the rules of appealability for
denials of motions to dismiss for FNC is through direct Supreme Court
action. Most notably, the Court can and should revisit and revise its
holding in Biard with new case law to allow such denials to fall within
the collateral order doctrine. While stare decisis generally cuts against
revisiting precedent, the Supreme Court was interpreting judge-made

194. Gardner, supra note 26, at 431.
195. Id. at 391.
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doctrine in Biard rather than a federal statute, and the Court will afford
less deference to stare decisis in this situation than when reviewing an
act of Congress.196 Additionally, overruling Biard would not cause
“significant damage to the stability of the society governed by” its
rule,197 and a seeming lack of reliance by parties specifically on the
appellate regime Biard endorses when making litigation decisions
would weigh against giving its holding great deference.198 Moreover,
the Court could easily distinguish the facts of Biard, which centered on
a loan dispute, from the kinds of global transnational cases that have
become more common in the three decades since the case was
decided,199 and this further reduces the deference the Court should
afford to Biard’s holding.200
The Supreme Court has said that “the class of collaterally
appealable orders must remain narrow and selective in its
membership.”201 Orders held to meet the standards of the collateral
order doctrine include: stays issued in light of ongoing state court
proceedings;202 orders involving absolute, qualified, or sovereign
immunity; and orders involving the criminal double jeopardy
defense.203 Orders that do not meet the doctrine’s requirements,
because the corresponding motions are available in almost every
litigation, include those tied to personal jurisdiction, statutes of
limitations, motions for summary judgment, and motions to dismiss for
failure to state a claim.204
196. See, e.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 274 (2014) (“The
principle of stare decisis has special force in respect to statutory interpretation because Congress
remains free to alter what we have done.” (citation omitted)).
197. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992).
198. See id. at 854–55 (noting that the potential costs of overruling a decision increase if “the
rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of
overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation” (citation omitted)).
199. Again, the district court in Biard summarily denied the relevant motion to dismiss for
FNC. Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 521 (1988). This lack of thorough district court
review may have resulted from unique circumstances surrounding the case that are easily
distinguishable from contemporary transnational litigation, including that the case involved two
individual parties and that Van Cauwenberghe had previously been extradited to the United
States, sentenced in related criminal proceedings, and prohibited from leaving the country. Id. at
520.
200. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 855 (indicating that “whether facts have so changed, or come to
be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification”
reduces the amount of deference that the Court needs to give to the rule (citation omitted)).
201. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 113 (2009) (citation omitted).
202. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10–13 (1983).
203. Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 350 (2006).
204. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 873 (1994).
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Motions to dismiss for FNC cannot be made in every case. The
federal transfer of venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404,205 applies to case
transfers among U.S. federal courts, but it does not cover dismissals in
favor of a foreign forum, which are still covered by the FNC doctrine.206
This renders potential FNC cases, those seeking dismissal from the
U.S. legal system entirely, a distinct and narrow class: “Between 1990
and 2006, there were roughly 691 (about 43 per year) reported
transnational forum non conveniens decisions by federal courts.”207
This reality helps satisfy the collateral order doctrine’s requirement of
covering categories of cases208 without fear that including FNC denials
under the doctrine would inundate appellate dockets with immediately
appealed FNC cases.
Additionally, of the three requirements for an order to be
immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine,209 Biard
only discussed the requirement that the order “resolve an important
issue completely separate from the merits of the action.”210 The Court
determined that denials of motions to dismiss for FNC did not meet
this standard and fortified this conclusion with an understanding that
appeals would remain available under § 1292(b).211 Yet, as explained in
Part II above, reliance on § 1292(b) for appeals in FNC cases is
misguided.212 Further, other judges have critiqued213 the Supreme
Court’s conclusion in Biard that motions to dismiss for FNC “will
substantially overlap factual and legal issues of the underlying
dispute.”214

205. 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (2018). Section (a) of the statute states specifically that “[f]or the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any
civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or
division to which all parties have consented.” Id. § 1404(a).
206. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 356 (reiterating that § 1404(a) “does not apply to
dismissals in favor of foreign forums, which continue to be governed by the common law doctrine
of forum non conveniens”).
207. Childress III, supra note 37, at 1036 (citation omitted).
208. See Van Cauwenberghe v. Biard, 486 U.S. 517, 529 (1988) (“In fashioning a rule of
appealability under § 1291, . . . we look to categories of cases, not to particular injustices.”).
209. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (outlining the contours of the collateral order
doctrine).
210. Biard, 486 U.S. at 527 (citation omitted).
211. Id. at 529.
212. See supra Part II (highlighting the infrequent use and ineffectiveness of appeals under
§ 1292(b)).
213. See supra note 97 and accompanying text (discussing the Third Circuit’s critique of
Biard).
214. Biard, 486 U.S. at 529.
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Sinochem International Co. v.
Malaysia International Shipping Corp.215 is a starting point for this
proposed reform. The Court’s reasoning in Sinochem is somewhat
inconsistent—acknowledging that FNC is “a threshold, nonmerits
issue” while also claiming that FNC decisions are too involved with a
case’s merits to fit into the collateral order doctrine.216 This apparent
contradiction should be resolved in favor of treating FNC as an issue
truly distinct from the merits and consequently covered by the
collateral order doctrine, particularly since Sinochem’s holding
encouraged the use of FNC in certain situations before even reaching
questions of personal jurisdiction.217 If the Supreme Court is adamant
that FNC can be an immediate first avenue for dismissing a case, it
makes sense for that determination to be immediately appealable so as
to avoid ever wading into difficult jurisdictional questions and to be
consistent with the Court’s trends against permitting transnational
litigation in U.S. federal courts.
Moreover, other than the Court’s stated preference for not
expanding the collateral order doctrine,218 there is little to suggest why
denied FNC motions as a class include too much factual and legal
overlap with a case’s merits to qualify for collateral appeal. The
Gonzalez v. Naviera Neptuno A.A. case discussed above illustrates this
point.219 A threshold determination of whether the United States or
Peru is the more convenient forum need not wade into the merits of
proving a wrongful death claim. The inquiries are conceptually distinct,
and this will consistently be true for transnational litigation cases as a
class.
Further, other classes of motion denials that currently are
immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine—most
notably denials of motions for qualified immunity220—arguably include
even more factual and legal overlap with a case’s merits than motions

215. Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007).
216. Id. at 432–33.
217. See id. at 436 (holding that it is proper for courts to decide FNC motions prior to
determining jurisdiction when jurisdictional questions are difficult and FNC factors favor
dismissal).
218. See Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 349–50 (2006) (noting that stringent conditions keep
the class of collateral order cases small and in line with the doctrine’s policy goals and the benefits
of finality).
219. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
220. See Will, 546 U.S. at 350 (identifying denials of qualified immunity as immediately
appealable under the collateral order doctrine).
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to dismiss for FNC. For example, qualified immunity is a judicially
developed common law doctrine invoked to provide government
officials with immunity from civil damages claims.221 An official
receives this qualified immunity unless she “violate[d] clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.”222 Denial of qualified immunity is subject
to immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine223 despite the
fact that, to determine whether immunity applies, a court must
investigate the objective reasonableness of an official’s conduct and
whether that conduct violated clearly established law of which the
officer should have been aware,224 both of which are arguably
substantive inquiries.
It is therefore unclear why the Supreme Court views FNC denials
as too entangled with the merits to warrant appellate review under the
collateral order doctrine. The Court has logical room to retreat from
this holding and align with other judges who have made arguments that
“[t]he decision on the merits[] . . . disposes of plaintiff’s substantive
rights, while the [FNC] decision addresses defendant’s rights (and the
rights of other participants in the law suit) to be tried in a forum
convenient to them and to be free from vexatious and harassing
litigation.”225 Additionally, as explained above, the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence since the 2007 Sinochem case has decidedly restricted
transnational litigation.226 Should the Court wish to revisit its
understanding that FNC denials are too entangled with a case’s merits
to fall within the collateral order doctrine, it can use its recent
limitations on transnational litigation as justification.
Stronger arguments exist that FNC denials also satisfy the first and
third prongs for immediate appealability under the collateral order
doctrine, both of which went unaddressed in Biard. Little doubt exists,
for example, that FNC determinations “conclusively determine the
disputed question,” which is the first requirement.227 Winning a motion
to dismiss for FNC will remove a case from the U.S. legal system, a
221. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806 (1982) (noting that “immunity from suits for
damages” for government officials stems from the common law).
222. Id. at 818.
223. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985).
224. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
225. Nalls v. Rolls-Royce Ltd., 702 F.2d 255, 258 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
226. See supra Part III (discussing recent trends in Supreme Court jurisprudence limiting
transnational litigation in U.S. courts).
227. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
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rather conclusive outcome and one that is also consistent with the
Supreme Court’s transnational litigation jurisprudence. Similarly, “it is
hard to imagine [a] case becoming any less appropriate for trial” in a
U.S. forum after a motion to dismiss for FNC has already been denied
and significant expenditures of time and resources made in the case.228
The third requirement of the collateral order doctrine—that an
order “be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment”229—is also met in FNC cases. The “crucial question”
relevant to the third prong of the collateral order doctrine is “whether
deferring review until final judgment so imperils the interest as to
justify the cost of allowing immediate appeal of the entire class of
relevant orders.”230 FNC denials meet this standard. Not only is waiting
until after final judgment ineffective,231 but postponing review also
severely threatens the interest at issue—“the right not to be tried in an
unreasonably inconvenient forum.”232 This is true for the entire class of
FNC cases, which all seek expulsion of the case from the U.S. legal
system.
Additionally, the goals of the FNC doctrine, including avoiding
overcrowded dockets, preventing overuse of U.S. legal resources, and
respecting foreign states’ policy choices,233 are some of the same
interests that the Supreme Court has articulated when restricting
transnational litigation in U.S. federal courts.234 Including orders
denying motions to dismiss for FNC as a class within the collateral
order doctrine by overturning Biard with new case law therefore
supports the substantial public interest in limiting transnational
litigation articulated by the Supreme Court while also remedying the
lack of effective review for erroneous FNC denials.
B. Altering the Biard Framework Through Rulemaking
The Supreme Court could also achieve the same result through
the rulemaking process. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 allows the Supreme Court “to
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence

228. Nalls, 702 F.2d at 258 (Wilkey, J., dissenting).
229. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468.
230. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 108 (2009).
231. In re Lloyd’s Register N. Am., Inc., 780 F.3d 283, 288 (5th Cir. 2015).
232. Nalls, 702 F.2d at 260.
233. BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 4, at 369–70.
234. See supra note 193 and accompanying text (describing rationales for the Supreme Court’s
current case law trending against transnational litigation in U.S. courts).
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for cases in the United States district courts . . . and courts of appeals”
that “may define when a ruling of a district court is final for the
purposes of appeal under section 1291.”235 Additionally, 28 U.S.C
§ 1292(e) states that “[t]he Supreme Court may prescribe rules, in
accordance with section 2072 of this title, to provide for an appeal of
an interlocutory decision to the courts of appeals that is not otherwise
provided for under subsection (a), (b), (c), or (d).”236 Consequently, the
Supreme Court has the authority to determine, by rule, that a denial of
a motion to dismiss for FNC is final for purposes of appellate review.
As it relates to this rulemaking power, the Supreme Court has
highlighted that “rulemaking, not expansion by court decision, [is] the
preferred means for determining whether and when prejudgment
orders should be immediately appealable.”237 In fact, the Court used its
rulemaking authority to allow appellate courts to conduct interlocutory
reviews of decisions granting or denying class certification requests.238
Unfortunately, some values that the Supreme Court lauds about
the rulemaking process—including that it seeks pragmatic solutions
while also utilizing experience from judges and practitioners—can also
serve as vices.239 If the Court tried to alter the appellate framework for
denied FNC motions by following the measured and laborious
approach it took in the class action context, which led to discretionary
appellate court review of class certification orders, the Court may fail
to improve FNC jurisprudence at all. Discretionary review for FNC
denials technically exists already under § 1292(b), but this discretion is
highly underutilized and ultimately ineffective.240 Further, plaintiff and
defense bars are unlikely to agree on allowing immediate appellate
review of denials of motions to dismiss for FNC given that, as with the
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in other areas of transnational
litigation, plaintiffs’ lawyers are likely to believe that FNC dismissals
disproportionately benefit corporate defendants.241
Additionally, the FNC context is distinct from the class
certification context. FNC denials will always more narrowly deal with
questions relating to transnational litigation, while class certification

235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

28 U.S.C. § 2072(a), (c) (2018).
Id. § 1292(e).
Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 113 (2009).
LOW ET AL., supra note 123, at 721.
Mohawk Indus., 558 U.S. at 114.
See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text.
See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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orders can apply to both transnational and domestic litigation contexts.
This makes FNC denials better suited for inclusion under the collateral
order doctrine. If the Supreme Court wants to turn the FNC doctrine
into an even more useful tool for restricting transnational litigation in
U.S. courts, it should seek to overturn Biard on its own and hold in new
case law that denials of motions to dismiss for FNC are immediately
appealable as of right under the collateral order doctrine.
C. Seeking Legislation to Achieve Reform
Finally, scholar Cassandra Burke Robertson has argued that
congressional intervention is the most desirable method for achieving
reform in this area.242 Congress may step in at any time to revise the
FNC or collateral order doctrines, as both are judicially developed
federal procedural common law.243 Doing so would align with the
perspective that Congress is better situated than the courts to weigh
transnational policy interests, including international comity and
respect for the sovereignty of foreign nations.244
Yet Congress is unlikely to pass such a statute,245 because “[a]part
from imperfect foresight, Congress suffers from another shortcoming
as a jurisdiction-managing institution—lack of interest.”246 Congress,
for example, has never intervened to address the FNC doctrine, despite
the doctrine’s long history in U.S. courts.247 There is little reason to
believe that Congress will act in these areas now, and overturning
Biard with new case law thus remains the best option for allowing
immediate appeals as of right from denied motions to dismiss for FNC.

242. See Robertson, supra note 9, at 467–68 (identifying statutory intervention as the most
desirable method for allowing appeals from denials of motions to dismiss for FNC).
243. See Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 815–16 (2008)
(“If Congress chooses to legislate, conflicting federal procedural common law must give way to
federal statute.”).
244. See Robertson, supra note 9, at 468 (“Congress could better account for the relevant
policy interests affected by [FNC]. Specifically, it could weigh comparative sovereign interests,
foreign relations, and economic realities.”).
245. Id.
246. James E. Pfander, Collateral Review of Remand Orders: Reasserting the Supervisory Role
of the Supreme Court, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 493, 534 (2011).
247. BRAND & JABLONSKI, supra note 7, at 37–38 (noting that the FNC concept in U.S. courts
can be traced as far back as the year 1801).
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V. DEFENDING A CHANGE TO IMMEDIATE APPEALS AS OF RIGHT
FROM DENIED MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FNC
This Part addresses some additional plausible critiques to the
argument that the Supreme Court should overturn Biard with new case
law if it seeks to strengthen the FNC doctrine by allowing immediate
appeals as of right from denied FNC motions in light of its goal to
restrict transnational litigation in U.S. federal courts. Objections may
include that such appeals are unnecessary or that the FNC doctrine is
itself so inherently flawed that any reform efforts are bound to fail.
To begin, critics might argue that the Supreme Court does not
need to alter the appellate scheme for FNC denials because the Court’s
other efforts to limit transnational litigation in U.S courts either (i)
sufficiently reduce the number of cases that merit dismissal through an
FNC motion, rendering the doctrine unhelpful, or (ii) otherwise fulfill
the same function as immediate appellate review of FNC denials
without needing to expand the collateral order doctrine. Yet the
Supreme Court sees the FNC doctrine as an integral component of its
ability to analyze the proper forum for transnational litigation and does
not endorse relegating the doctrine to a secondary role. For example,
the recent dissent in Jesner and the opinion concurring in the judgment
in Kiobel both highlighted the important role of the FNC doctrine in
ensuring litigation takes place in the proper forum.248 Given the
continued filing of motions to dismiss for FNC, allowing immediate
appellate review of FNC denials under the collateral order doctrine
would only increase the utility of the doctrine for this purpose.
Other critics may suggest that inherent problems with FNC as a
doctrine render futile any attempt to alter the appellate scheme for
denied FNC motions. One way to make this type of argument is to
assert that the FNC doctrine is unhelpful because it gives insufficient
guidance for judges and leads to unpredictable results.249 Similar
arguments claim that the doctrine infringes on comity and foreign
relations considerations that it supposedly seeks to advance by cutting

248. See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1430–31 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(highlighting that FNC serves alongside other tools, including narrowed grounds for personal
jurisdiction, to dismiss transnational cases from U.S. courts); Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum
Co., 569 U.S. 108, 133 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (noting that the FNC
doctrine serves as a limiting principle that “help[s] to minimize international friction”).
249. See Gardner, supra note 26, at 395 (“[S]cholars and judges alike have critiqued the
doctrine for its poor design and overbroad discretion, the combination of which provides too little
guidance for judges and thus too little predictability for parties.”).
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off access to courts and imposing litigation on alternative forums.250
Statistics indicating that 40 to 50 percent of motions to dismiss for FNC
in published opinions are granted,251 and that over 95 percent of cases
dismissed for FNC never reach trial in an alternative forum,252 may
suggest that FNC dismissals are already too frequent and ultimately do
not result in litigation continuing in an alternate forum.
These arguments are unpersuasive. First, statistics regarding FNC
motions can be misleading. They do not take into consideration
countervailing factors that may prevent a case from going to trial in a
foreign forum, including settlement negotiations. Moreover, looking at
the grant rate for motions to dismiss for FNC in reported cases will not
tell the full story of judicial reliance on the doctrine, as unreported
cases are more likely to include denials of these motions than their
published counterparts.253 Further, concerns about how disputes may
proceed in an alternative forum must be calibrated against the idea,
both in the United States and in foreign countries, that U.S. courts
should not be “de facto world courts.”254
Second, the discretionary nature of the FNC doctrine, which may
make it appear to be inconsistently applied, is a common attribute of
legal balancing tests that choose to sacrifice predictability in favor of
more case-specific review.255 To the extent that concerns remain about
consistent application of the doctrine or a lack of perceived guidance

250. See id. (highlighting the possibility of retaliation by a foreign forum in response to a
dismissal based on FNC as harmful to long-term U.S. interests).
251. See id. at 396 (“[F]ederal judges grant roughly half of motions to dismiss for forum non
conveniens, at least in written opinions.”); id. at n.33 (citing articles suggesting a dismissal rate of
between 40 and 50 percent for motions to dismiss for FNC during different ranges of years studied
between 1982 and 2012).
252. See Steinitz, supra note 137, at 77–78 (“[E]mpirical data available demonstrate that less
than four percent of cases dismissed under the doctrine of forum non conveniens ever reach trial
in a foreign court.” (quoting Dow Chem. Co. v. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 683 (Tex. 1990) (Doggett,
J., concurring))).
253. Cf. Pauline T. Kim, Margo Schlanger, Christina L. Boyd & Andrew D. Martin, How
Should We Study District Judge Decision-Making?, 29 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 83, 97 (2009)
(“[P]ublished opinions . . . constitute only a small portion of opinions, and that portion is
decidedly unrepresentative.” (citation omitted)); Weigand, supra note 118, at 220 (discussing that,
in the context of § 1292(b) requests for interlocutory appeal, denials are more likely to go
unreported than “grants of certifications and allowances of appeal”).
254. Steinitz, supra note 137, at 78–79.
255. See Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 YALE L.J. 644, 646 (2014) (“With
rules, the Court can buy itself uniformity, predictability, and low decision costs, at the expense of
rigidity, inflexibility, and arbitrary-seeming outcomes. With Standards, it can buy itself nuance,
flexibility, and case-specific deliberation, at the expense of uncertainty, variability, and high
decision costs.”).
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for lower court judges, such worries can be assuaged by supporting the
proposal to allow for immediate appellate review of denied motions to
dismiss for FNC.
It should also be noted that a federal appellate regime for motions
to dismiss for FNC where both grants and denials of the motion are
immediately appealable as of right has proven operational in the past.
Both the Fourth Circuit and state courts so held prior to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Biard,256 and numerous states continue to allow for
immediate appeals from denials of motions to dismiss from their own
FNC doctrines.257 Canada, which also has an FNC doctrine,258 similarly
has federal and provincial law that allows for immediate appeals as of
right from denied motions to dismiss for FNC.259 If the Supreme Court
wants to alter the current appellate regime to allow for immediate
appeals as of right from denied FNC motions, concerns that such a
framework is untenable are therefore non-starters.
Moreover, the justifications for making this proposed doctrinal
change should be clear in the context of the Supreme Court’s recent
jurisprudence limiting transnational litigation in U.S. federal courts.
The Supreme Court has identified that “United States law governs
domestically but does not rule the world.”260 Additionally, the Court’s
jurisprudence seeks to avoid separation of powers concerns resulting
from encroaching on the foreign policy expertise of the political
branches.261 Further, general principles of comity restrain the court
from “offending foreign nations or infringing on their regulatory
authority.”262 Notably, international comity—“the recognition which
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or
256. See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text.
257. See, e.g., FL. R. APP. P. 9.130(a)(3)(C)(ix) (2018) (listing “the issue of forum non
conveniens” as a non-final order from which appeal may be brought); 210 PA. CODE § 311(c)
(2018) (“An appeal may be taken as of right from an order in a civil action or proceeding changing
venue, transferring the matter to another court of coordinate jurisdiction, or declining to proceed
in the matter on the basis of forum non conveniens or analogous principles.”).
258. See BRAND & JABLONSKI, supra note 7, at 75–85 (discussing Canada’s FNC doctrine).
259. See, e.g., Federal Courts Act 27(1), R.S. 1985, c. F-7 (Can.) (stating that “[a]n appeal lies
to the Federal Court of Appeal” from both final and interlocutory judgments of the Federal
Court); Mazda Canada Inc. v. Cougar Ace (The), [2008] F.C.R. 219, paras. 25–27 (Can. Fed. Ct.
App.) (reversing the lower court’s denial of a motion to dismiss for FNC on immediate appeal
and holding that Japan was the proper forum for the litigation); Bouzari v. Bahremani,
[2015] ONCA 275, para. 54 (Can. Ont. Ct. App.) (reversing the lower court’s denial of a motion
to dismiss for FNC on immediate appeal and finding England to be the proper forum).
260. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 115 (2013) (citation omitted).
261. Id. at 116.
262. Bookman, supra note 133, at 1100.
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judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international
duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other
persons who are under the protection of its laws”263—is increasingly
important as the number of adequate alternative forums increases in
quantity and overall desirability for litigants.264
These systemic concerns regarding the role of the U.S. legal
system and its federal courts have combined with practical
considerations about fairness to defendants,265 the drain on U.S.
resources of hearing unnecessary cases,266 and the reality that plaintiffs
will forum shop for favorable rules and biased populations267 to
incentivize the Supreme Court to limit transnational cases in U.S.
federal courts. These considerations also justify immediate appellate
review of denied motions to dismiss for FNC: without such review, a
single trial judge’s decision may moot these policy interests by
improperly keeping a case within the U.S. legal system without any
effective method of appellate review.268
Immediate appealability can also increase the predictability of the
specific types of transnational cases that should not proceed in a U.S.
federal court by allowing appellate panels to consistently review
denials of FNC motions for consistency. This review then increases the
amount of case precedent for lower court judges to use as guidance
when applying the doctrine to new cases. Finally, defendants otherwise
settling with plaintiffs out of convenience rather than merit may also
be more willing to defend themselves through the legal process if they
know that a panel of appellate judges—who arguably have a better
view of systemic concerns regarding international comity or the types
of cases that should not be heard in U.S. courts than individual district
court judges more involved in the daily litigation process and motion
practice with litigants—will review the merits of their FNC claim.
263. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
264. See Quintanilla & Whytock, supra note 136, at 33–35 (juxtaposing a decrease in
transnational litigation in U.S. courts alongside the increasing likelihood that other countries will
be chosen in place of the United States as the forum for transnational litigation).
265. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) (discussing the
weight afforded to the “unique burdens placed upon one who must defend oneself in a foreign
legal system”).
266. See Childress III, supra note 37, at 1041–42 (discussing docket and case management
concerns along with costs and abuses of litigation as reasons that U.S. courts are restricting
transnational litigation).
267. Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779 (1984).
268. See supra Part II (outlining the ineffectiveness of all current methods for reviewing a
denial of a motion to dismiss for FNC).
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Immediate appellate review of denied FNC motions is therefore
about more than performing standard error correction on appeal. Such
review is about fulfilling systemic goals of the U.S. federal courts in
limiting transnational litigation as articulated by the Supreme Court of
the United States. Immediate appellate review as of right from denied
motions to dismiss for FNC would give the federal courts another
mechanism by which to achieve this policy at the outset of a litigation
and would also be consistent with Sinochem’s holding that motions to
dismiss for FNC can be addressed even before standard personal
jurisdiction issues.269 Ultimately, this outcome would be best
achieved—and readily so—by the Supreme Court overruling Biard
with new case law.
CONCLUSION
This Note has identified the dichotomy in the current appellate
regime for motions to dismiss for FNC whereby grants of the motion
are immediately appealable as of right but denials of the motion, under
the Supreme Court’s Biard precedent, are not subject to immediate
appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Altering this framework to
allow for immediate appeals as of right from denied FNC motions
would align with the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence limiting
transnational litigation in U.S. federal courts. The most
straightforward way for the Court to make this change is to reverse its
thirty-year-old holding in Biard with new case law. This would allow
the Court to use the FNC doctrine as an additional tool to further its
separation of powers, comity, fairness, and efficiency rationales for
restricting the use of U.S. federal courts as a forum for transnational
litigation.

269. See Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malay. Int’l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 436 (2007) (holding
that it is proper for courts to decide FNC motions prior to determining jurisdiction when
jurisdictional questions are difficult and FNC factors favor dismissal).

